Agents work by reference
An agent can list, create, rotate and ask, and gets back names and fingerprints. The MCP server has no reveal tool, and the server refuses an agent token on reveal and inject whichever client sends it.
Secrets, kept by reference
Ambry is a self-hosted secrets service built for a world where AI agents do the deploying. Agents create, rotate and request secrets without ever holding a credential that can reveal one. People reveal, deploy runners inject, and every open is written to the audit chain.
Agents manage secrets by reference. They never hold a credential that can reveal a value. The MCP server has no reveal tool, and the server refuses an agent token on reveal and inject, so a clever client does not get around it.
Ambry exists because agents decrypting a vault in a shell printed values into transcripts, and a redaction pipe is not a control. The only fix that holds is an agent credential that cannot return plaintext at all.
| Action | People The dashboard and ambry, logging in each time | Agents An MCP server and an agent token | Runners A deploy runner and a token scoped to one namespace |
|---|---|---|---|
| List secrets, read their metadata, query the audit log | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Create a secret whose value the server generates | Yes | Yes gets back a fingerprint, never the value | No |
| Rotate a secret to a new generated version | Yes | Yes same: a fingerprint comes back | No |
| Enter a value only a person has | Yes | No files a request; a person fulfils it | No |
| Reveal a value | Yes an explicit, audited action | No refused by the server, whatever the client | No |
| Inject values into a deploy step | No | No refused by the server | Yes only for the namespace it is granted |
| Administer principals, tokens and grants | Yes | No | No |
An agent that needs a secret put to work triggers a pipeline. The runner holds the only token that can inject, scoped to one namespace, and the value goes into the step. The agent sees the step's output.
Needs a secret used. It triggers the deploy pipeline and names the target.
Holds: An agent token: list, create, rotate, ask. It cannot reveal.
Fetches the target’s namespace from Ambry and injects the values into the step.
Holds: A runner token granted inject on exactly one namespace.
Runs with the value in its environment. The runner redacts known values from the log.
Holds: The value, for the length of the step, and nothing that can fetch another.
libsodium primitives only, one key that never enters the database, and an audit chain that has to accept a row before a value moves.
An agent can list, create, rotate and ask, and gets back names and fingerprints. The MCP server has no reveal tool, and the server refuses an agent token on reveal and inject whichever client sends it.
A deploy runner holds the only token that can put a value into a step, granted on exactly one project/env. A credential that deploys staging provably cannot touch production.
Every rotation is a new version. Each value is sealed under its own key, and the ciphertext is bound to its namespace, path and version, so a row moved elsewhere fails to open.
Every write and every open is recorded in the same transaction as the change, on a chain MACed under a key only the server holds. No audit row, no value.
The key-encryption key is a 32-byte file on the host, readable by the service alone. The server refuses to start without it, and refuses a store sealed under a different one.
The nightly job restores its own dump into a throwaway cluster, verifies the audit chain and opens every value, and seals only the bytes that passed, to a key kept offline.
Three things are named as not built, among them biometric sign-in, finer reveal permissions, and kek rotation. One more are built and not yet running. The status page lists each one in its own words.
The server, the CLI, the MCP server, the dashboard and the deploy integration, and what each one is allowed to hold.